Tigers in the Air

[USMCRET6391]

Leatherneck | Dr. F. H. Allison | May 04, 2006
The Harrier is a “jackknife” of an airplane. Captain Sam C. Schoolfield attested that you can “fold it up and take it with you.” The characterization is a good one to describe the AV-8B's operations in the global war on terror (GWOT). The aircraft has operated from every type of base devised by man -- aircraft carriers, improved airfields, expeditionary airfields and austere forward operating bases (FOBs). Indeed, it's the only tactical jet that has done so. One squadron, the “Tigers” of Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) 542, has operated the Harrier in all of these settings.

The Tigers of Second Marine Aircraft Wing are home-based at Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, N.C. The squadron was one of two Harrier squadrons (the other was VMA-223) deployed aboard USS Bataan (LHD-5), one of the “Harrier carriers,” during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I, March-May 2003.

During OIF I, Tiger pilots and other Harrier fliers displayed the expeditionary qualities of the Harrier by availing themselves of fuel pumped at the FOB established at An Numaniyah, Iraq. The squadron returned to the States, but within a year it was back in the war. Six Harriers and 80 Marines of VMA-542 made a scheduled deployment as part of the aviation combat element of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), which sailed in February 2004. Two months later they were in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

Meanwhile in May 2004, the remainder of VMA-542's Harriers and personnel made an unscheduled deployment to Iraq and provided air support in OIF II's unexpectedly intense ground combat. This split deployment in 2004 represented the first time that a squadron has operated separate and simultaneous combat deployments in two separate theaters.

Experience Counts

Lieutenant Colonel Russell A. Sanborn has been at or near the top of the squadron thus far in the GWOT. He was the executive officer in OIF I, while LtCol Francis P. Bottorff commanded. Sanborn became the commanding officer in June 2004.

Not a stranger to Iraq, during the 1991 Gulf War while flying a mission against targets in Kuwait, an Iraqi surface-to-air missile smashed into and disabled his jet. He ejected, was captured and was the guest of Saddam Hussein for about three weeks. Back in theater 12 years later for OIF I, he flew air strikes in Iraq. He never let his POW experience negatively affect his flying. He observed that once “on the tram line, it's all business.”

There were differences between OIF I and II for Harrier pilots. In OIF I, the Tigers flew from the Harrier carrier. It was almost like being “bomb trucks,” said Capt Jennifer Dolan. The pilots ranged far north into Iraq, refueled going and coming either in the air or at the An Numaniyah FOB and dropped their ordnance in between.

These were long missions, up to five hours long. They flew close air support (CAS) for Marines and coalition troops often, but more frequently they were vectored to an open kill box, found a target and attacked it. OIF I missions were challenging because there was always the potential for enemy ground fire and dust storms, while night operations from a carrier or a blacked-out FOB could be daunting.

The FOB used during OIF I at Numaniyah proved necessary when aerial tankers were in short supply. After flying the 200 miles or so up from the northern Persian Gulf, Harriers needed gas if they wanted more than one pass over the target. The Harrier's short takeoff and landing capability allowed it to land on Numaniyah's 8,000-foot cratered runway, only recently liberated.

It was in rugged conditions yet close to the Marines who needed air support, indeed close enough that firefights were visible at night. Living conditions were à la Henderson Field for the Cactus Air Force on Guadalcanal in World War II. Showers were the same technology: drums or buckets with holes in the bottom, either hand- or hose-fed with water.

Night landings at the Numaniyah FOB, which were commanded by LtCol Ken M. Woodard, were a real attention-getter. The Numaniyah FOB operated lights out and had no covert lighting -- light visible through night vision goggles only.

It was a “big black hole,” Capt Dolan recalled. Capt Schoolfield and Major Keith Blakely made the first night landings there and relied on a hovering UH-1 Huey helicopter to illuminate the runway for them. The Numaniyah FOB supported 203 Harrier sorties during OIF I. Despite the high foreign-object damage (FOD) potential at Numaniyah, no Harrier engines were dinged or destroyed by Iraqi gravel or debris at Numaniyah.

In April 2004, the situation in Iraq unexpectedly turned from security and stability operations to full-blown combat. Leathernecks of I Marine Expeditionary Force, which was the senior Marine operational force during OIF I, needed Marine tactical jets to provide a heavy air-support punch.

The Tigers of VMA-542 were one of the squadrons that received the call. So, in the midst of preparations for a scheduled CONUS exercise and with six of their jets deployed with the 22d MEU(SOC) to Afghanistan, the Tigers were alerted that they were the “ready squadron” to deploy on short notice.

The new commanding officer, LtCol Chester A. Arnold, and LtCol Sanborn, the XO, readied the Tigers for war once again. Briefings, personal readiness, training, inspections, inoculations and family readiness were prioritized. Within 12 days the Tigers were ready to deploy. The deployment order was not long in coming and became reality when cargo planes showed up to load them out for Iraq.

Return for Round Two

The Tigers flew 10 of their Harriers across the Atlantic Ocean, stopping in Spain and Qatar. As a flight of the Harriers flew along the coast of Egypt on the leg to Qatar, LtCol Sanford's comment of “say goodbye to green” proved to be an accurate assessment of their future operating area.

After flying 8,400 miles from Cherry Point, on May 18, 2004, the Harriers landed at Iraq's Al Asad Air Base, followed soon by the main body of 185 Marines from VMA-542 and Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) 14. Joining the Tigers at Al Asad was VMA-214, the “Black Sheep,” who, commanded by LtCol Mark Everman, had flown 10 Harriers across the big pond from Yuma, Ariz.

When the Tigers and Black Sheep arrived in May 2004 at Al Asad, it had been used solely by helicopters. They were the first tactical jets to operate there. Rocks and gravel that could be sucked up into the intake of a tactical jet and trash its engine littered the taxiways. The runways and operating surfaces were cratered by coalition bombs delivered during OIF I when Al Asad remained one of Saddam's main bases. It was hot; temperatures passed 100 degrees by 10 o'clock. It was an expansive, Soviet-style airfield. Concrete bunkers proliferated, and the carcasses of old Soviet jets littered the grounds. Unaimed and usually nondestructive enemy rockets occasionally slammed into the base.

Although modern when it was built, Al Asad had fallen into disrepair. The walls of the buildings were decorated with a blend of Islamic writing and pictures of Saddam, but little upkeep had taken place. Capt Schoolfield said it was like “20 years ago somebody put a billion dollars in that place and didn't spend a dime since.”

Al Asad was the land of “not quite right,” and patience was a chief virtue. The infrastructure of the base was in a shambles. Electrical power, a dependable water supply, communications, things that are required to fly and fight were sometimes just not there, and adjustments had to be made. Pilots briefed at night by the light of flashlights. Air conditioning was sporadic; usually it went out during the heat of the day.

Since night operations predominated, sleeping in the day was almost impossible. Everyone lived in tents at first, then “cans.” These small, metal modules had no air conditioning, so neither tents nor cans were conducive to sleep. Eventually one can was hot-wired for air conditioning, and it became the dedicated pilot sleeping can. About 15 to 20 racks were stacked in it, pilots “hot-racked” to get the rest required to be on their game when flying the demanding Harrier fighter/bomber. Despite the austere conditions of Al Asad, squadron Marines did not complain, being fully aware that their standard of living was much higher than the grunts or rotary-wing pilots.

Marines worked long hours to keep the squadron running and the AV-8s flying. They maintained a 12-hours-on, 12-hours-off work routine for 76 days before there was a nonflying day, all in the heat and talcum powder dust of Iraq. The squadron flew its Harriers at 220 percent of the normal rate, averaging 52 flight hours per aircraft per month.

Despite the challenges of operating and working at Al Asad, morale remained high. LtCol Sanborn noted that the focus and dedication of the Harrier force at Al Asad, in supporting I MEF Marines, made his job as commanding officer much easier. There were few distractions away from flying, fixing and working, causing him to suggest, “four months in peacetime are harder than six months in combat.”

Combat flight operations were of a much different character in OIF II than in OIF I. The missions were much shorter. Al Asad, unlike operations from Bataan , was close to the action -- somewhat like being close to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), if there were a FEBA, that is. The problem was that there was no FEBA in OIF II; the enemy was everywhere and nowhere, a shadowy, stealthy assassin well integrated into a mostly friendly populace.

A main mission for fixed-wing tactical aviation was convoy escort. The Harriers provided “high cover” for land convoys that snaked across Al Anbar province at night. The Harrier's engine noise provided a deterrent to attacks on the convoys. Reaction to the insurgents' hit-and-run attacks or locating the point of origin of a rocket or mortar attack was a challenge throughout. For these missions, the Harrier's Litening II targeting and reconnaissance pod proved a valuable asset.

In the midst of the wartime deployment at Al Asad, LtCol Sanborn, who had become the commanding officer in June 2004, completed two unit integrations into VMA-542, the first time in any Harrier squadron's history. The first integration was a six-plane detachment of VMA-214, the Harrier element of the 11th MEU(SOC), which came inland to Al Asad in September 2004. The main part of VMA-214 had returned to Yuma in August.

The second unit integration occurred the next month. This time six aircraft and Marines of VMA-211, the “Wake Island Avengers,” which had been the Harrier Det to the 31st MEU(SOC), joined VMA-542. This last merger made Sanborn the “den daddy” of a 22-plane Harrier force and more than 350 Marines from three different squadrons from two coasts.

Keyhole CAS Is the Answer

The big game for OIF II was Operation Phantom Fury or Al Fajr, the Fallujah battle that occurred in November 2004. The Tigers were due to rotate back to CONUS in October; however, Sanborn lobbied and received permission to remain for Al Fajr. The prospect for doing urban close air support in Fallujah, a densely constructed, monotonous urban terrain, was daunting. The Marine Corps officers who planned the CAS system used at Fallujah made it workable, efficient and ultimately successful; it was characterized as “keyhole CAS.”

Keyhole CAS integrated the high volume of CAS assets available into the intense and fluid urban combat that took place in Fallujah's tight urban terrain. It was a fast-paced and effective command and control system. Pilots had to be ready to prosecute their target when called upon, or they would be “kicked out” of the airspace over Fallujah. The Al Asad-based Harrier force, Tigers, Black Sheep and Wake Island Avengers, all flew missions that put ordnance spot-on during the Fallujah battle, including more than 100 precision-guided bombs.

Taking It to the Taliban

Missing all of this action, but getting some Afghanistan action instead, were the six aircraft, nine pilots and 80 Marines of VMA-542 that had sailed in USS Wasp (LHD-1) in February 2004, the Harrier part of the 22d MEU(SOC) aviation combat element. By April, the MEU, including the Harrier Det that set up operations at the remote and austere airfield at Kandahar, was deep in Afghanistan.

Kandahar airfield was so primitive that no other tactical jet operated from there, not even the Air Force's rugged A-10. From there they were close to action and supported coalition forces, primarily the MEU's Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, Sixth Marine Regiment, in operations against the Taliban in remote Oruzgan province.

Under the command of LtCol Sean C. Blochberger, the Kandahar Tiger Det flew more than 960 combat missions in 1,339 hours of flight from April to July 2004, an extraordinary op tempo. Indeed, the Tiger Det of six aircraft flew about 150 hours per month, which is more than the average Harrier squadron would fly in garrison, with a full complement of 16 aircraft.

The Tiger Det in Afghanistan launched two sections of Harriers daily, and with gas from an Air Force tanker, each two-aircraft section of Harriers covered a five-hour period, resulting in 10 hours of coverage each day for the Marines or other coalition forces. In most cases the Harrier's powerful punch was not required for the low-intensity searching operations that characterized BLT 1/6's ground operations. But when troops were in contact (TIC), it was needed 30 times.

Tiger AV-8s responded to the TIC with a threatening loud, low pass or lit up ridgelines with 25 mm rounds or 5-inch Zuni rockets or lowered the boom with a laser-guided bomb. Delivering ordnance or not, the prevailing pilot attitude was “anything that aids the guy on the ground [means] we're doing our job.”

Tiger Marines who maintained the jets in Afghanistan or kept the squadron functioning administratively had similar feelings, best expressed by Staff Sergeant Christopher M. Nolting: “We knew if we kept those birds in the air, the boys on the ground would be that much more safe. That was our top priority.”

They were quite successful in doing that, even though facilities were rudimentary. The Marines in the Tiger Det had a piece of airfield tarmac they could call their own, and that is where the jets were parked and maintained while they supported coalition operations, March through July 2004.

The airfield's taxiways and runways were eroded, pocked and well seeded with rocks and gravel waiting to be sucked up by the Harrier's powerful engines. Such an occurrence would incur about the same damage as a bullet into the engine. So, the squadron Marines made diligent FOD walks, daubed up the cracks in the concrete with tar, used the “FOD boss,” a mechanical sweeper pulled behind a small tractor called a Gator, and maintained proper separation between aircraft while taxiing. As at Al Asad and An Numaniyah, there was no FOD damage of Tiger Harriers.

In summary, Harrier operations in the GWOT confirm that the AV-8B is the most flexible tactical jet in the inventory. Vertical short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) was once again validated as a needed capability for forward-deployed forces. The Harrier's VSTOL capability and flexibility to operate from less-than-optimum airfields solved the accessibility problem for close air. Harriers were close to the action and provided responsive and potent air support to Marines fighting the ground war. The leathernecks of VMA-542 gained a career of experience in the space of one year as they reproved the value of the aviation side of the air-ground team.

Editor's note: Retired Marine Reserve Maj Fred Allison is an oral historian in the History Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Va.