Czar Recommended for Army Transformation

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InsideDefense.com NewsStand | Sebastian Sprenger | May 25, 2006

Senior Army leaders should appoint a “modular force czar” to manage the service's ongoing reorganization into flexible, brigade-sized units, according to an unreleased December 2005 Army Science Board report.

Among other duties, the czar would help prioritize plans and produce schedules for the multiyear effort, which will end up costing the Army billions of dollars but, according to service officials, will put it on a better footing to prosecute the global war on terrorism.

The report, dubbed “Enhancements to the Modular Force,” is the result of a fiscal year 2005 “summer study” the panel conducted at the behest of Army acquisition executive Claude Bolton.

Although the study results were finalized last year, the service only completed a security review of the document this month. The final report is unclassified, but it is considered sensitive because of “technological and administrative content,” according to the document's cover page.

Inside the Pentagon obtained a copy of the report this week.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker unveiled the service's modularity concept in 2004. The idea behind the move is to break up the service's division-centered force structure, packaging troops and equipment into smaller, more easily deployable, brigade-sized units. Service officials want to achieve that goal without sacrificing overall warfighting capabilities.

As the service works to implement the initiative, “it is . . . not clear that the Army is taking a very critical look a the non-materiel and non-organizational elements of DOTMLPF,” which is short for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities, according to the science board's final report.

“It appears to us that the necessary management, business and engineering processes are still not adequate for the job,” the board members write.

Therefore, the panel recommends the creation of a “Modular Force Integration Office” and the appointment of the so-called czar for managing concept implementation.

Specifically, the czar should be in charge of prioritizing and allocating the funding needed for modularity, the report reads. Also, the official should be responsible for implementing and integrating a “master plan/schedule” and a “system of systems engineering approach,” the document adds.

If the recommendation is adopted, the czar would be in charge of developing a plan to insert new technology into the modular force as the concept matures inside the service, according to the report. Further, the official would be tasked with naming a “modular force software architect.”

An Army spokeswoman was unable to return a reporter's request for comment from Bolton about the report by press time (May 24).

Meanwhile, the Government Accountability Office says the price tag for completing the Army's reorganization into a brigade-based force has risen sharply over the past few years, sister publication Inside the Army reported earlier this year. Auditors now expect the effort to cost $52.5 billion through fiscal year 2011 -- up from estimates of $28 billion in 2004, according to an April 4 GAO report.

While there is little disagreement about the merit of modularity per se on Capitol Hill and within the Defense Department -- particularly when it comes to making the Army more flexible -- some have questioned how the concept is being implemented.

The House Armed Services tactical air and land forces subcommittee “continues to have questions about the details of the modularity initiative, not the least of which is its escalating costs, especially considering other costly procurement programs,” panel Chairman Curt Weldon (R-PA) said in an April 4 statement.

The Army Science Board strikes a similar tone.

“As the emerging centerpiece for Army transformation, the Modular Force still has challenges it must overcome,” the science board members concluded in their report. “Not the least of these is challenges is the current budget reliance on one supplemental after another,” they add.

In FY-05 and FY-06, the Pentagon directed the Army to fund its modularity project through emergency spending supplementals, a practice criticized by a number of lawmakers who wanted the funds included in the service's regular budget requests.

For FY-07, the Army, for the first time, included modularity funding in its official budget request.

Besides questions about cost, some are unsure whether the current modularity plans will enhance the Army's combat capability. Papers prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses found the Army's modularity concept as currently envisioned would leave service less fighting power than it has now (ITP , March 9, p3; and Jan. 26, p1).

“The current Army plan for fielding 43 [active duty] two-battalion [brigade combat teams] does not provide the optimum allocation of scarce [service] manpower resources,” according to one of the IDA papers, also obtained by ITP. “The essence of land power is resident in the maneuver battalions that occupy terrain, control populations and fight battles, not in headquarters and enablers. Yet the Army plan reduces the number of maneuver battalions by 20 percent below the number available in 2003, while increasing BCT headquarters by 11.5 percent.”

High-level service officials have criticized IDA's findings, saying the group employed “Cold War metrics” for measuring combat effectiveness, according to a February report on modularity by the Congressional Research Service. The analysis failed to factor in the effect of “combat multipliers,” such as the modular force's Armored Reconnaissance Squadron or the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Squadrons, on overall combat capability, the officials have argued.

However, critics and proponents of the Army's modularity effort disagree about the benefits those new squadrons could provide on the battlefield.

In its February report, CRS singles out some “key potential oversight questions” for lawmakers to consider this year as they work on their FY-07 defense authorization and appropriations bills:

* “How many modular brigade combat teams does the Army plan on fielding, and what are the risks associated with activating fewer BCTs than originally planned?

* “What lessons have been learned by Army modular units in Iraq and Afghanistan that could affect the modularization of the rest of the Army?

* “What are the specific modularity-related personnel and equipment shortages facing the Army?

* “Does the Army's current modular force design adequately address counterinsurgency and stabilization operations?”