The administration's best case so far so support the UAE port deal...

[Grimmy]

http://www.radioblogger.com/#001406


The administration's best case so far so support the UAE port deal...

02-22bone.mp3

HH: Time to welcome now to the Hugh Hewitt show Admiral Craig Bone, rear admiral of the United States Coast Guard. He is the director of port security in the Maritime Safety Security and Environmental Protection Directorate at U.S. Coast Guard headquarters, and that means he's in charge of all aspects of Coast Guard port security. Admiral, welcome to the Hugh Hewitt show.

CB: Thank you very much, Hugh.

HH: I want to begin, Admiral, by thanking you and every member of the Coast Guard for the extraordinary service throughout the history of the service, but also since 9/11. It's been an unbroken record of successful defense of the nation's port, and I know most Americans recognize that and appreciate it. So when we talk about these port issues, and the Dubai World Ports deal, it's against that backdrop, Admiral. Admiral, what do...

CB: Well, thank you very much, Hugh, and the men and women of the Coast Guard are proud to serve, as are the other members of the armed forces.

HH: Absolutely. What do the companies like Dubai World Ports do at the ports of the United States?

CB: The primary role of the operation sets that actually take place at terminals, a lot of people are misnomering it just as ports, and managing ports. And really what we're talking about predominantly in these areas is stevedoring services who are providing cargo movement services in the ports. In the case of container ports, I mean assisting the movement of cargo containers to and from the vessel to the facility, or moving it around the facility, and moving it onto a truck chassis that may move into middle America later. Also, in the case of a car carrier, it may mean moving cars off of a large car carrier. Or in the case of exports, moving them onto a large car carrier, and exporting it overseas. Coal or other bulk cargos, again, it's assisting in their uploading operations and handling. It could also mean stores or refurbishment of the ship from suppliers here that are providing supplies to the ship, and assisting them in moving that on board the ship. But a lot of people think these ships are big, and they are very big, but they don't often have a lot of people when it comes to cargo handling. And the facilities provide that service to the vessel carriers.

HH: In every instance, there will be a port operator of these services. Does the Coast Guard control...obviously, the Coast Guard's in charge of security in coordination with local law enforcement. But it's the Coast Guard's job. Do they control the personnel who run these port management companies?

CB: What we have is oversight of all of these operations. The Coast Guard, every single facility, and every single vessel that comes in is required to have a facility security plan in accordance with the Maritime Transportation Security Act. I can tell you that over 3,000 facilities, port facilities have met that requirement and are in compliance, and there's literally thousands of foreign and U.S. flag ships that also are required to have security plans that the Coast Guard ensures are not only in place and complaint, but they're in compliance and they're meeting those requirements.

HH: Now Admiral Bone, does the Coast Guard actually run background checks on the employees that are hired by these companies, pursuant to those plans?

CB: The actual responsibility for the background of the individuals, and vetting of individuals, is the responsibility of the companies themselves. And there is a process...they have to include that process as part of the plan. That's part of our review of their security plans, as well as their access controls for people, and cargo moving through it, and how they screen and identify people. Many facilities have their own identification badges for their employees, and their own I.D. systems, and as well as for stevedoring services, to identify them as they come to the facilities. Because you're allowed on a facility doesn't mean you're allowed everywhere on a facility, or to carry out all operations on that facility. And individuals may have access, but they may be escorted, or limited access, depending on their line of work. We review that plan to make sure that only those people who have a need to be in particular areas are there. I can tell you that all of the security officers have, in fact, been identified by the Coast Guard, and we do in fact look at those individuals in particular. And quite often, they're members of our area Maritime Security Committee, which helps address security portwide, not just at one facility or another.

HH: Do port managers of the sort that Dubai World Ports will be if they take over the managment of the warehousing, etc. at these six ports, do they have information access, or access to information about port activities not generally available to the public?

CB: The only information that they might have is if there's a particular risk, and the people that are involved in the security of those facilities. But the folks that we're talking about with PNO, I don't know of any of them that are facility security officers. In fact, our assessment is that none of them are facility security officers. As such, they would have information about cargo operations, you know, and activities on the facility, but not necessarily about particular security operations.

HH: But if a sensitive cargo was incoming or outgoing, they would know about it, because obviously, they have to deliver it, and they have to know that it's sensitive, correct?

CB: No, that's not true, either.

HH: Okay. Explain to me.

CB: Normally, the law enforcement entities and the security entities will be addressed in specific, and the subcommittees, even within the area security committee, break down into law enforcement and security operations, separate from the general discussions of security. In other words, part of the group...we include labor in the security committee, because even a longshoreman or stevedore needs to be familiar what to do if in the event there's a security incident. We don't want people to operate in an environment that, you know, if something happens, or something unusual takes place, they're not smart enough to know to report it, know what conditions are set, and know what areas to avoid.

HH: Of course. But Admiral, my question is really getting to something as a layman, I just don't understand. If, for example, a shipment of liquid nitrogen...and I'm even assuming it can be shipped. I don't know...is incoming to a port, that would make that a target of opportunity, would the public generally be aware of that? And if not, would the management company be aware of sort of sensitive cargos like that?

CB: Well, I think again, I don't know that I'd call that an overly sensitive cargo. I think the proper handling of that may be addressed by stevedoring services. But the security and safety of that operation is one that there's procedures in the port, and there's people responsible for overseeing that operation, which are not in the stevedoring services arena.

HH: Now the two biggest objections I have heard to this potential transfer is that it will increase the opportunities for agents who have penetrated the foreign company to conduct very unobtrusive surveillance of port operations. How do you respond to that, Admiral?

CB: Well, I don't think that that's true. The other thing is, everyone who comes into the U.S. and wants to work has to have a passport and a visa, even if they are a foreign national.

HH: Of course.

CB: And therefore, there's a level of scrutiny that goes through on that process. The idea that all of a sudden, we're going to allow individuals to penetrate our borders is really foreign to me. And I think what you've seen since 9/11 is a concerted effort across the board to prevent that from taking place.

HH: Then the heart of my objection, Admiral, and I know it's widespread, is that even though the UAE is a great and wonderful ally in the global war on terror, and this company has a wonderful reputation, that al Qaeda is deeply entrenched in the Emirates, and that pressures can be brought to bear on reliable people through their family, through threats, etc., that make them less reliable, even though they can get into the country after vetting, that places them at the port that gives them access to information and the ability to conduct surveillance, and that we just aren't...we're just not far-flung enough to know about threats like that. How do you respond to that?

CB: Well, again, I think that you have to rely on the people that are currently authorized to come into this country, whether it's an airport or the port environment itself. This system of vetting individuals through our ports, or through our airports, and allow them coming through, is a mature one. Again, any gaps have been closed as best as possible, and other efforts may be underway. I think that you have to rely on the intelligence community as well as the public in general of any unusual activities that you detect something like that. I have to start with the premise that people are law abiding individuals. This security issue is a global one. It's not just unique to the United States. If we're going to solve this, it has to be a global effort. Moving cargos through our ports, the majority of those cargos are foreign born. We need the cooperation and the increased level of confidence internationally, not a decreased level of confidence. And there's a lot of effort that's been done internationally, both through the International Maritime Organization, as well as the World Customs Organization, and through the International Standards Organization for Security, to basically move our borders out so that our solution set, as you would say, isn't waiting for it to come here, but to have it detected somewhere else, and not allow it to ever reach our shores.

HH: And do you think a political rejection of this deal would in some way harm that international cooperation, Admiral?

CB: I think anything...I don't even know. I mean, I'm not privy to that. Again, I'm responsible for providing security at the ports. But I think that the focus what I was getting at is when you have entities that you're working internationally to improve security, and you see that improvement, and it's direct, you should reflect upon that and not assume negative information based upon positive actions.

HH: All right. I don't want to abuse your time, and we're getting close to the end of it, Rear Admiral Bone. You served as the captain of the Port of New York and New Jersey, so you know with first-hand knowledge the immensity of that security task. Putting everything else aside, is a port like that less secure or more secure...and I don't mean insecure, but just less secure or more secure when these sorts of activities, stevedore management, some cargo, some piloting, are operated by a foreign company, than when they're operated by a United States company?

CB: I see no change.

HH: None at all?

CB: The same standards, the same security requirements apply, whether it's owned by a U.S. owner or a foreign owned...the same's true with vessels that operate in our ports. The same's true with the security operations. We look at the risk or the threat environment, the intel and the targeting potential. And again, we work across the board to address any potential threat or scenario set.

HH: Admiral, I'm going to ask one more question, because I really would love to be persuaded on this, but intuitively, I think to myself, if you switch out a U.S. company or a British company, and your management structure changes, so that you have even a hundred of five thousand employees are now UAE nationals with families in the UAE, subject to the pressure and the threats...even though it might not have dropped below safe level, it's had to have become a more complicated process. What am I missing there?

CB: Well, your assumption is that everybody that's now operating there is a UAE citizen. And that's your false assumption.

HH: No, no, because I actually have been...

CB: Many of these folks that are doing this work are longshoreman union. They may be hired out by the PNO company and operators, they're people that live in your and my neighborhoods that are doing this work. Your assumption, and that of many people that are going down this road, is that the people that are carrying out this function have drastically changed, and the work force that was doing the work yesterday has drastically changed.

HH: No, actually, Admiral, I'm not, because I've been to the Dubai World Port website. In fact, I'm looking right now at Matthew Hogue, who's the general manager of their Venezuela operation. He's an American with 11 years in U.S. merchant mariner. So obviously, it's an international company with an international workforce. But my assumption is information flows will go back and be available to UAE officials, and that there will be an increased UAE management presence that would be inevitable with...I've also looked at their website, where they're hiring like crazy in UAE for jobs around the world. So my assumption is that there will be some increase in UAE national workforce presence at these ports. Am I just wrong about that?

CB: Well, what I'd offer is that if there's a belief by the intel community or others that sets of operations in our ports, regardless of their site of origin, or regardless of whether or not it was U.S. members or U.S. individuals providing that set of information, that that would require some follow-up action, obviously, because security could be compromised. But you're going down a road of making assumptions that something's going to happen, which hasn't happened to date to our knowledge. And I think that that would be a significant change. And we also...the different communties wouldn't detect it.

HH: That is, that is the assumption, and I want to close on the note that nothing has happened thanks to the efforts of you and every member of the United States Coast Guard, and we appreciate that greatly, Admiral.

CB: Well, thank you very much, Hugh. And again, I hope I've rested at least some of the concerns of the general public, but I can tell you that just as you said, the men and women of the Coast Guard, the Customs and Border Protection, and Transportation Security Administration and other agencies, as well as the state and locals, spend every day to try and ensure the safety and security of the public.

HH: And that's known and appreciated, and thank you for the time this afternoon, Rear Admiral Craig Bone. Thank you, sir.

End of interview.

[Grimmy]

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Wednesday, Feb. 22, 2006 10:05 p.m. EST
Tommy Franks Defends Dubai Ports Deal

Former CENTCOM commanding general Tommy Franks said Wednesday that the Bush administration was right to approve a deal for a United Arab Emirates-based company to run six major U.S. ports.

"We have more U.S. Navy ships using the port in Dubai, Jebel Ali, than any other port outside the United States," Franks told Fox News Channel's "Hannity & Colmes."

The former Iraq war commander explained U.S. reliance on the Dubai port facility by saying, "We know he difference between an enemy and a friend."

"The Emirates is a friend," Franks aid. "That is the best run port that I've ever seen."

Gen. Franks said the Dubai company had three essential qualities that commend it for the task of running U.S. ports: The capacity to handle the job, the inclination to do it right and security, which he noted "will remain, in any case, in the hands of the United States Coast Guard."