History of the Office of Naval Intelligence

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Office of Naval Intelligence - ONI

Since 1882, the Office of Naval Intelligence has provided the intelligence weapons and personnel to sustain the preeminence of United States seapower. The basic mission has remained the same as that posed to ONI's founder, Lieutenant T.B.M. Mason, by the then-Secretary of the Navy, to collect and record "such information as may be useful ... in time of war as well as in peace."

Until World War I, when it took on vastly expanded duties in the field of counter-intelligence, ONI was primarily a collector, collator, and disseminator of all kinds of information about foreign intentions and naval-related capabilities. Immediately after World War II, ONI became responsible for what is now known as "operational intelligence."

Counterintelligence continued to be a major ONI function until the establishment of a separate Naval Investigative Service in 1976. With the formation of the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1962, much of ONI's responsibility for politico-military intelligence was transferred to the new, joint-service agency. Operational intelligence and scientific and technical intelligence continued to grow in importance and scope within ONI as the threat posed by the Soviet Union continued to expand during the Cold War era.

Since its inception in 1882, ONI has had many organizational structures and missions. The past thirty or so years have seen the intelligence missions of ONI become more established and widely recognized.

The Office of Naval Intelligence was born on 23 March 1882, the brainchild of Lieutenant Theodorus B.M. Mason. At that time, the US Navy was in danger of becoming a force in name only. Because advancements in naval science and technology were not officially encouraged, the US Navy could not compete with those of Europe, where research into ship design, construction techniques, propulsion, and weapons resulted in the development of new concepts that were then applied in support of their navies. In the United States, any information collected on foreign developments accumulated in the respective Navy Bureaus, with little or no coordination between them. Conflicting theories and views abounded; a consensus of opinion was impossible. To correct that situation, Secretary of the Navy William Hunt created an advisory board to establish uniform positions for the Navy and its Bureau Chiefs.

LT Mason was an accomplished linguist with an inquisitive mind, and was widely respected within the Navy. He had travelled throughout Europe observing and recording developments, and he knew what information was available and how to get it. He believed the Navy should assign naval attaches to embassies and Negations throughout the world to collect intelligence on advances in naval science. He also recommended that a section be created in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy to assemble, correlate, and distribute reports on the intelligence gathered.

Secretary Hunt eventually heard and agreed with most of LT Mason's recommendations, and consequently issued General Order Number 292. With LT Mason at the helm as "Chief Intelligence Officer" as part of the Navy's Bureau of Navigation, located in a small space in the State, War and Navy Building (now known as the Executive Office Building).

In the beginning, the office had difficulty gaining access to foreign information held by other Navy Bureaus; but Secretary Hunt's successor, William Chandler, facilitated access by directing the Bureau Chiefs to share their records and information with each other "without formality." Eventually, the other Bureaus began to recognize the office's value and even used its information in justifying funds needed for Navy expansion and modernization.

In addition to reports from naval officers abroad, the office used foreign publications and technical literature procured by the Navy Department Library, which was also part of the Bureau of Navigation. The Navy Hydrography Branch Offices also augmented the office's files by providing charts, sailing directions, light lists, and other information solicited from commanding officers of naval vessels and masters of merchant ships.

In September 1885, the Naval War College was founded in Newport, Rhode Island. The Naval War College used much of what the office produced as background information for its courses and to give realism to its classroom work on strategic and tactical problems.

In addition to work with the War College, the office assumed the Navy's war planning function. That seemed logical at the time since it was the focal point for information about foreign forces. Later, the office shared responsibility for planning with the newly established General Board of the Navy. (The arrangement lasted until 1915, when the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) was established and a separate division was created to engage in war planning).

On 21 October 1889, the Navy Department Library and War Records Office, headed by Professor James Soley, transferred to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. Professor Soley had always been a strong supporter of the Naval War College, but Commodore Francis Ramsey, new Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, had been against its establishment. Naval intelligence was caught in the middle of their opposing views; the conflict was resolved in 1890 when the office, along with its naval attaches, were transferred to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and placed under the Assistant Secretary, as originally recommended by LT Mason.

By January 1893, the office was maintaining records on the navies of Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile, China, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Norway, and Turkey. At the outbreak of the Cuban Revolution (1895), much of its effort shifted to accumulating information on the Spanish Navy and coastal defenses. When Theodore Roosevelt became the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1897, he quickly let it be known that he was going to work closely with office personnel. He believed Chief Intelligence Officers should provide advice and assistance to Department heads, as would Admiralty Board members in England's Royal Navy.

Following the February 1898 sinking of the USS Maine, ONI' s naval attaches in Europe and commercial agents in Washington became involved in negotiations to purchase ships and munitions. On 25 April, Congress declared war on Spain, and the next day the office transferred back to the Bureau of Navigation, which directed the operations of the fleet. At the same time, the Naval War Board was established to advise the Secretary of the Navy about the Navy Department's strategic policy.

That same year, the office was officially recognized by Congress, when it appropriated funds to hire five clerks, a translator, an assistant draftsman, and a laborer. Nevertheless, retention of qualified military and civilian personnel remained a problem. Prior to 1899, foreign representatives could get virtually any information they wanted directly from any naval officer or activity; American attaches did not know what had been released by Washington. Consequently, the Secretary of the Navy directed that ONI act as the agency furnishing all official information to attaches or foreign officials. This increased the workload but put US Navy attaches in a much better position to negotiate for necessary information.

During this period, the "Instructions in Regard to Intelligence Duty" were modified to require the collection and classification of information on all subjects connected with war or which could affect naval actions or plans, and the office was asked to assist in preparing detailed contingency plans for afloat or shore operations. In addition to providing intelligence, the office also began translating foreign documents for the Secretary of the Navy and Bureaus of the Navy Department.

The Navy underwent a major reorganization in 1909. Four aides were established to advise the Secretary of the Navy and the heads of the Navy's administrative divisions: Personnel, Material, Inspections, and Operations of the Fleet (the senior division). The Chief Intelligence Officer, Captain Charles E. Vreeland, became the "Aide for Operations," and in 1910, the title of his successor, Captain Templin M. Potts, was changed to "Director of Naval Intelligence" (DNI).

During World War I, the office collected technical information to help improve fleet capabilities rather than information of an operational nature. When the post of Chief of Naval Operations (COO) was created in 1915, the office became the Division of Naval Intelligence, and the Naval Intelligence Service was reorganized to facilitate obtaining, processing, and filing all possible information from all available foreign sources. War planning responsibilities were transferred to another division, but naval intelligence continued to provide intelligence to planners as required.

Captain Roger Welles, Jr., the head of the Division of Naval Intelligence in 1917 and throughout the remainder of the war, was later promoted to Rear Admiral while in office-the first flag officer to fill the post of DNI. During World War I, a major responsibility was added to the roster of tasks that ultimately came to make up 90 percent of the office's efforts: security. Working through the growing network of Naval District Intelligence Offices and primarily using Naval Reserve personnel, Naval Intelligence took responsibility for all aspects of security-from war materials plant protection, to security checks on Navy personnel, censorship, and ferreting out spies and saboteurs. Ships arriving from foreign countries were inspected, investigations were made of anyone deemed suspicious, and shipyards and munitions factories were supervised and advised on security procedures. The many personnel involved in these activities returned to their civilian pursuits after the war, but the Naval District Intelligence Offices retained their counterintelligence functions and served as the nucleus from which a similar counterintelligence effort grew during World War II. By the time the Armistice was signed in 1918, there were 306 Naval Reservists and 18 civil service employees in naval intelligence.

After the war, activities were reduced but policies did not change. The office produced reports that reflected world conditions, summarized the needs of the naval intelligence service, and continued to provide valuable intelligence. It also became involved in the exploitation of Japanese communications. However, there was a lack of organization, funds, and personnel during the 1920s that made it almost impossible to meet the Navy's intelligence requirements.

By the late 1920s, the office was providing intelligence to several executive departments and Navy Department bureaus. It published classified information for Navy use, provided liaison with foreign officers, performed public relations duties for the entire Navy, and still collected, classified, and filed old records. It also worked with the Army's Military Intelligence Division and other executive departments to obtain useful information about foreign governments (social, political, economic, industrial conditions, etc.). This information was used by the President and Congress when considering appropriation bills and by American delegates to the many international conferences on naval arms limitations.

From the outset, there had been a recurring argument from some in the military community who believed that the evaluation of information was not an "intelligence" function. However, in 1929, the CNO's Statement of Functions made it clear that the office's primary duty was to collect, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence. This codified a critical concept: information must be evaluated before it becomes intelligence.

The years preceding World War II were filled with change. Funding dwindled while the workload increased; there were always questions about whether the value of information obtained by Navy attaches warranted the cost of maintaining offices in the countries to which they were posted. Lack of personnel remained a major problem.

In 1939, Rear Admiral Walter Anderson became the DNI. Anticipating the outbreak of war in Europe, he established a section to keep track of the world' s merchant shipping routes, a strategic information center to gather and furnish information on request, and a secret intelligence section to handle confidential agents. He also initiated training of officers for censorship duties. The Foreign Intelligence Branch was divided into sections that covered the British Empire; the Near and Far East; Western, Central, and Eastern Europe; the Balkans; Latin America; and Enemy Trade. In 1941, the Branch was expanded by three sections: Special Intelligence, Statistical, and Strategic Information; Enemy Trade was renamed Foreign Trade.

There were four different DNIs in the year prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Rear Admiral Anderson left for a battleship command. Captain Jules James, Acting DNI, was replaced by Captain Alan Kirk, who later took a command at sea. Rear Admiral Theodore Wilkinson assumed the post in October, and was still DNI on 7 December 1941. He had never before served in an intelligence billet.

The DNI and the Director of Communications disagreed over who should control dissemination of communications-derived intelligence; the transcript of the Japanese Navy operational code was broken by the Office of Naval Communications, but the translation work was done by intelligence linguists. The conflict was resolved in the DNI's favor.

The attempts to turn naval intelligence into a mere collection agency had serious consequences that were not acknowledged by the CNO's War Plans Division in 1941. A significant gap in the Navy's readiness existed because there was no organization devoted solely to collecting, correlating, and evaluating all available intelligence. Those who wondered who was to blame for Japan's success did not seem to recognize that Japan had successfully covered its preparation and movement of forces positioning for the attack on Pearl Harbor. The US high command could not believe that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor; therefore, all intelligence reports were evaluated accordingly.

While facing increasing intelligence requirements, the office experienced another major reorganization in March 1943, and the Assistant DNI's title was changed to Deputy Director. A new organization, the North American Desk, was created to oversee intelligence collection within the entire United States. This tapped valuable information on foreign countries, and the office initiated a list of sources in each Naval District. The Operational Intelligence Section was created but only existed for a few months because most senior officers felt that no organization should devote itself to producing intelligence for one type of customer.

Submarines played a major role during World War I, and during World War II, their importance became even more obvious to both sides. The Navy' s first wartime periscope photo reconnaissance mission was conducted by the USS Nautilus (SS-168) in September 1943, prior to U.S. forces landing on Tarawa. Submarines also supported coast watchers and guerrilla forces in the Philippines, providing personnel, equipment, and other supplies as needed. ONI-produced radio propaganda broadcasts, intended to undermine enemy morale, were aimed primarily at German submarine crews and proved effective.

The invasion of Europe and the capture of more islands in the Pacific resulted in an increase in the volume and quality of documentary intelligence. Intelligence teams went ashore with initial landing parties to gather documents and equipment of intelligence value. A vast amount of information was returned to the United States for evaluation, and the office took over the Washington Document Center, a central agency for handling captured Japanese documents.

In January 1944, it assumed control of the Photographic Interpretation Center from the Deputy CNO's Air Intelligence Group. February 1945 saw the creation of the Naval Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC). The Photographic Interpretation Center conducted technical research, interpretation research, and industrial studies, and produced graphic presentations and terrain models. The needs of the fleet were determined through consultations with operating units, and information a disseminated in the form which most nearly conformed to fleet unit requirements.

Immediately after the war, the CNO was reorganized; and the DNI was titled Chief of Naval Intelligence, heading the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Although naval intelligence had existed since 1882, a delineation of its duties or relation to the rest of the Navy had never been part of the Navy Regulations. This oversight was remedied in 1946, and new provisions were implemented. The CNO recommended the integration of intelligence activities of the Marine Corps and Navy Department to include all aspects of naval intelligence, especially the development of plans and doctrine for amphibious operational intelligence, assignment and intelligence training of regular Marine Corps officers, and procurement and training of Marine Corps Reserve officers as intelligence specialists.

In August 1946, ONI was were shifted to the Operations Division of OPNAV and absorbed the Operations Chartroom, which became the Operations Intelligence Branch; ONI then became formally involved in operational intelligence. At the same time, part of ONI's organization, the Office of Naval Records and Library, was removed, combined with the Office of Naval History, and placed under the Deputy CNO for Administration. ONI also formed a joint committee with the Coast Guard to review intelligence relations.

Immediately following World War II, the Navy's operating forces were drastically reduced, but the need for intelligence expanded as a result of pressures brought on by the Cold War. In 1947, the restricted line (Special Duty Intelligence) personnel designator "163X" was created to provide career opportunities for World War II Naval Reserve intelligence personnel with significant expertise. In 1948, a selection board was also convened to select regular officers from unrestricted line officer applicants to be designated "1630."

The National Security Act of 1947 required unification of military services and provided for greater coordination between intelligence activities of the various armed forces. Air Force intelligence studies often conflicted with the Navy's, strengthening their claim that ONI's organization was inadequately and improperly staffed to process air intelligence. In response, the Navy provided ONI with more aviators.

To standardize titles within the Intelligence Community (the heads of Army and Air Force Intelligence Divisions and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were designated "Directors"), the Chief of Naval Intelligence again became the DNI in November 1948.

The circumstances surrounding the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in 1950 were similar to those at Pearl Harbor in that, although the North Koreans' capabilities and ultimate intentions were recognized, the timing of their invasion was not well anticipated. The outbreak of hostilities in Korea dramatically increased ONI's workload, resulting in authorization of new billets and the recall of Naval Reserve intelligence officers. ONI quickly responded to the expanded need for aerial reconnaissance, and air intelligence officers and photo interpreters were quickly integrated into the operations of Naval forces in and around Korea. At the same time, airborne electronics intelligence aircraft formed the nucleus of what became known as Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadrons (VQs) and later operated widely throughout the Cold War.

In the early 1950's, a period of drastic organizational change, ONI began using automation, initially to compile information on merchant ship characteristics, and later for a variety of tasks. In 1954, as part of another major CNO reorganization, ONI was placed under the Vice CNO. This move put us on the same organizational level as counterparts in the Army and Air Force.

Decentralization continued when the Basic and Technical Intelligence Branch was broken up and the Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center (NAVSTIC) was set up at the Naval Observatory in 1960.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was created in October 1961 to improve the effectiveness and responsiveness of Department of Defense intelligence products and activities. The joint Army/Navy/Air Force effort in air intelligence (in existence since World War II) was transferred almost completely to DIA.

Until 1963, it had been Navy policy to fill the DNI billet with an unrestricted line officer. Rear Admiral Rufus Taylor was the first Intelligence Specialist to hold the position of DNI. And NPIC was redesignated as the Naval Reconnaissance and Technical Support Center (NRTSC).

When conflicting information about the Vietnam situation was received from the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACH), and from Navy attaches in Saigon, Secretary of Defense McNamara disestablished the Navy attache organization in Vietnam. In December 1964, Secretary McNamara issued a directive establishing the Defense Attache System as an organizational function of DIA. All Naval Attaches and Assistant Naval Attaches accredited to foreign governments and "other DOD personnel assigned to attache posts" became part of the Defense Attache System. The DNI was designated as the Navy's point of contact for Defense Attache matters.

Another reorganization began in July 1967 with the establishment of the Naval Intelligence Command (NAVINTCOM). The DNI became Commander, Naval Intelligence Command but retained the title of Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence). In 1969 Task Force 168 was established within NAVINTCOM to meet the increasing need for more responsive fleet intelligence support. Task Force 168 evolved into the worldwide collection arm of Naval Intelligence. And in 1976, under DNI direction to develop a coherent Navy program, the Navy Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program (NFMEP) was reorganized into the Navy Foreign Materiel Program (NFMP).

Until 1977, the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) was also double-hatted as Commander, Naval Intelligence Command (COMNAVINTCOM). In September of that year, the two offices became separate flag officer assignments. COMNAVINTCOM also took up the assignment of Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence. In 1979 the Naval Investigative Service (NIS), which had been under the ONI umbrella, became a separate second-echelon command. Its director retained the title of Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence for Security, while the DNI retained policy guidance responsibilities.

In 1983, NFOIO was redesignated the Navy Operational Intelligence Center (NOIC).

The computer technology explosion in the preceding decade led ONI's NIPSSA to undergo a reorganization in late 1987 to apply more effectively the new technology to Intelligence support. NIPSSA became the Naval Intelligence Automation Center (NIACEN), to better reflect its broadened missions and functions. NISC, the Navy's organization with the primary mission of scientific and technical intelligence analysis, was redesignated the Naval Technical Intelligence Center (NTIC) in 1988.

As of 1989, the Naval Intelligence Command (NIC), under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations, directed and managed the activities of NIC to ensure the fulfillment of the intelligence requirements and responsibilities of the Department of the Navy. The Naval Intelligence Support Center processed, analyzed, produced, and disseminated scientific and technical intelligence on foreign naval systems, in order to support national and Navy strategic plans, research and development, objectives, and programs. The Naval Intelligence Processing System Support Activity planned, sponsored, developd, and managed automated naval intelligence, information processing, and communications systems. The Navy Operational Intelligence Center (NAVOPINTCEN), under the Commander, NIC, produced finished operational intelligence, including indications and warning, ocean surveillance information, and in-depth analyses of adversary strategy, doctrine, tactics, and readiness in response to the requirements of the JCS, Department of the Navy, Defense Intelligence Agency, and joint commands, and provided timely dissemination of such intelligence to support planning and execution of military and naval operations. Naval Intelligence Operations Group / Task Force 168 (CTF 168) provided intelligence collection support to the fleet through forward area support teams (FASTS), exercised collection management for Naval Intelligence, commanded the Navy's Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection program, and performed such other functions and tasks as may be directed by higher authority.

The Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, demonstrated again ONI's ability to respond to crises immediately with relevant data and analysis. Over 400 Naval Intelligence Reservists were called to active duty to augment staff in Washington and the Middle East.

Facing both budget reductions and the benefits to be derived from combining scientific and technical intelligence disciplines with operational intelligence efforts, ONI began consolidating assets in October 1991. This first consolidation move combined NTIC, NOIC, CTF 168 and part of NIACEN into one production-oriented organization known as the Naval Maritime Intelligence Center, NAVMIC. The remaining elements of NIACEN became the Naval Intelligence Activity (NAVINTACT). Finally, the analytical, operational, collection, and ADP sections of the organization were rejoined. The role of NIAC was more clearly defined to be support oriented, including ongoing preparations for the new ONI building. Some changes were made to NIC Headquarters activities. A significant reduction was made in management and support overhead without sacrificing production support and analysis.


The final consolidation and restructuring goals were met on 1 January 1993 when the final configuration of ONI was established, combining NAVMARINTCEN, NAVINTACT, and the second-echelon headquarters of NAVINTCOM, into the unified, streamlined Office of Naval Intelligence. Redundancy of functions and competing missions were eliminated from Naval Intelligence. This required the total combination of all assets in NIC, Suitland, as well as some of those previously on the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) staff in the Pentagon. The NIC Headquarters organization and the two remaining component commands were decommissioned. What resulted is a totally streamlined organization with a chain of command that extends directly from the DNI down to the individual analyst and support individual with minimum layers of management in between.

The final design of ONI's structure and the implementation of that design has been completed using the principles of Total Quality Leadership (TQL). ONI has established an active TQL program which has been instrumental in assessing and finding solutions for the processes through which the organization operates. With the complexity, size and worldwide distribution of the organization, TQL practices have provided unique tools for facing this challenge.