Wanted: Iraqi strongman (Moqtada al-Sadr need not apply)

[Batgirl]

By Con Coughlin
Last Updated: 12:01am BST 27/04/2007

Long before we invaded Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power, anyone with the most rudimentary knowledge of Iraqi history understood that, to prevent the country's disintegration as a political entity, a powerful leader was needed to keep the ethnically and religiously divided populace at bay.

Saddam's brutal dictatorship was merely the latest in a long and undistinguished line of autocracies to have imposed their will on this nation of sullen malcontents, starting with the Hashemite monarchy, which relied heavily on Britain to sustain its rule, and the succession of military dictators that established the template of brutal political repression that Saddam was only too happy to imitate.

Had Saddam not developed a penchant for invading his neighbours and threatening vital oil supplies, it is likely the West would have continued to tolerate his domestic barbarity. Even when it became obvious that Saddam's behaviour could no longer be tolerated, both Britain and America recognised he would need to be replaced by another strongman, the only difference being that the new tyrant would be our tyrant, a Mubarak rather than a Nasser.

Unfortunately for the coalition, none of the early front-runners mooted in the heady aftermath of the war managed to stay the course. First there was Ahmed Chalabi, the darling of Washington's neo-cons, who, despite their messianic desire to erect a beacon of Jeffersonian democracy in the heart of Mesopotamia, recognised the need for strong leadership. Chalabi's personal ambition, and the fact he was better known outside Iraq than within, saw his challenge quickly peter out.

Next Dr Ayad Allawi, Britain's favoured contender and a former Ba'ath activist, made a strong showing, but was fatally undermined by his close association with the US-led coalition.

Since then, Iraq has seen a succession of unimpressive and relatively anonymous figures attempt to impose their will on the country, the latest being Nouri al-Maliki, the current prime minister who has struggled - and failed - to hold together the fragile coalition that has attempted to govern Iraq this past year.

Maliki's current difficulties stem from his attempt to be all things to all men: he has sought to maintain a close alliance with George W. Bush while at the same time seeking to accommodate pro-Iranian Shia politicians such as Moqtada al-Sadr. It was a balancing act that was never going to last, and the inevitable upset occurred last week, when Sadr resigned from the Iraqi cabinet, together with his six ministers, making the Iraqi government unworkable.

Sadr says he was frustrated by Maliki's failure to negotiate the withdrawal of coalition forces. The more likely explanation is that this most populist of Iraqi politicians senses the moment is fast approaching when the Iraqi government can no longer maintain even the appearance of running the country, and the various governments responsible for maintaining the coalition's military presence are giving every sign that they want to cut and run at the earliest opportunity.

This week's vote by the House of Representatives to set a March 2008 deadline for the complete withdrawal of US troops, and the looming change of occupancy in Downing Street, will certainly encourage Sadr and his followers in their belief that the coalition's days are numbered, as are those of Iraq's first democratically elected government. If that happens, Iraq will need a new strongman, and Sadr is carefully positioning himself for the post-coalition powerplay.

The 37-year-old Sadr is no stranger to political violence. His father, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, one of Iraq's leading ayatollahs, was murdered in 1999 by gunmen working for Saddam. Since then, Sadr has learnt the effectiveness of using brutality to achieve his own goals. He was deeply implicated in the murder of rival Shia cleric Abdul Majid al-Khoei, who was the victim of a frenzied knife attack by Sadr's supporters in Najaf in April 2003. His black-clad Mahdi army, which is more mafia than military outfit, has since indulged in an orgy of killing, terrorising local Shia into supporting Sadr's radical agenda for establishing an Islamic state in Iraq.

The tactics are no different to those Saddam used to maintain himself in power for three decades, and Sadr and his supporters believe there is no reason why they shouldn't work for him. Sadr's ability to promote himself as the standard bearer of Iraqi nationalism and the most vociferous critic of the coalition's continued presence in Iraq are other factors that have helped him to build an impressive power base.

Unlike Iraq's other strongmen who, irrespective of the deplorable methods they used, managed to hold the country together, Sadr is a divisive force, one who would plunge Iraq into full-scale civil war were he ever to find himself in a position to dominate the national agenda. His militia might succeed in forcing the Shia to accept his radical Islamist agenda, but his ideology is anathema to the Kurds and Sunnis who desire a secular state. Any attempt by Sadr and other radical Shia leaders to impose their will on Iraq's other sectarian groups would result in a catastrophic deterioration in the country's security situation, one that would ultimately lead to the break-up of the state, with all the security implications that would have for the wider region.

For Iraq to remain a unified state, a different type of strongman is required, one who has the interests of the whole country at heart, not merely narrow sectarian concerns. Coalition commanders on the ground are only too well aware of the threat that Sadr and his allies pose, which is why the Mahdi army is one of the main targets of the "surge" in American military activity in Baghdad.

Like Sadr and the US Congress, there is nothing the military commanders would like more than to withdraw their forces from Iraq at the earliest available opportunity. The difference is that they want to leave once threats to Iraq's long-term future - such as Sadr and the Mahdi army - have been dealt with, not before.

Telegraph